Why there wouldnt have been a war during Op Parakram

Why there would have been no war

India, Jan 2003

Indian media has been presenting articles and feature presentations on the possible hostilities and the manner in which they could/would have been presented.

Firstly, it is amazing to see the Army’s position laid bare like this, post-facto the deployment. The articles are right in their presumption/fact, that we were closer to war than we had ever been on the past three decades. However, one would beg to present another point of view. 2002 was going to see a war that never was.

For a person interested in our military posturing, you have to look back into our past, not too distant at that.

Kargil, Jammu and Kashmir, Northern India, 1999

Kargil, when our borders had been encroached upon and international opinion was either on our side or silent, but definitely not on their side, our politicians showed their real mettle. Large-scale deployments and an all out war scenario existed on the frontline, albeit over just 170-200Km long Dras-Batalik sectors.

You would be surprised to see how many times the Goverment, in press and private, insisted that the LoC not be crossed, not be infringed upon, that everyone from soldiers to pilots participating in that offensive had to put their own lives and machinery in danger to attack from what was often not the best angle for approach or attack. The enemy’s use of reverse slopes to direct fire, and the therefore the difficulty for our artillery or airforce eliminate the nuisance caused. Manpower was lost due to this fact, and that is a fact. A few lives, maybe even ten or just a hundred would have been saved had we been allowed to cut across, and seal their entry and exit routes, and scale up their relatively undefended maintenance routes.

Given our mobilisation there, and the speed at that it was effected, the chances of the Pakistani Army opposing us in strength was bleak. De-inducted troops from Siachen Glacier, movement of troops from counter-insurgency operations, additional Units from nearby Corps came around almost within weeks to the area of conflict.

The Pakistani Army did deploy its forces to a higher level. There was movement of Brigade HQs and the Mountain Div HQ up one level. Portions of 19 Inf Div (Pakistan), and the forward movement of an Infantry Brigade in the region was noticed. The Skardu AF Base was activated with the deployment of F-16s and a Wing from Chaklala, and movement of Crotale SAM regiments was seen in the Chaklala/ Skardu area.

As much as this sounds, this much movement on that side indicated a possibility that India would escalate, and the Pakistani PM already on tenterhooks because of the Indian escalation, gave orders to move defensively, that not much territory be lost on the rebound. The movement gave the Indian Army no reason to worry, as we had moved over two divisions into the region, and the Pakistani reinforcements were not capable of mounting anything significant on our side of the LoC. Besides there was almost the entire IAF north of Gwalior on operational readiness to tackle the minor air support that Skardu could give their own troops.

Given that enemy return routes were not blocked in most of the places, it enabled the Pakistani intruders to retreat into the safe haven of 'across the LoC' when persistent Indian artillery and infantry assaults made their positions untenable.

Due to this absolutely stupid persistence, we lost a golden chance to get PoWs/ inflict severe casualties on the persons holding our posts.

The Operation was a success in the sense that our posts were recovered and the 'sanctity' of the LoC was restored. It should be taken with a pinch salt, that the border there is called the LoC because of the fact that there is no sanctity to it.

The roots of 'No War in 2002' lie in this above story.

A goverment that had no guts to even scratch the LoC, when we had every right to do so, when our land was taken by the enemy, where would they have the courage to avenge just a 'botched' attempt at blowing up the Parliament building. It is indeed ironical that the very seat of power that couldn’t be ruthless in defending its own territory bore the brunt of its own 'paranoid-defensive-strategy.'

India, December 2001 - Jan 2002

Either without taking the Army into confidence or by putting the mouth before the trigger, the statements and posturing politically led the Army to believe that it was finally headed to conflict.

The gung-ho political leadership, of which everyone thought he was a part of the war committee, goaded on the Army, and the word ‘Deployment’ probably meant more than anything else. Given their exuberance, that they did not want to appear ‘inactive, defensive or cowardly,’ everyone shouted about the ‘completion of deployment’ as if it were their new election motto.

Beyond a certain level of mobilisation, the army simply has too many eggs in one basket. A 100% recall itself means 30% more troops due to leave cancellation. Forward mobilisation of Units belonging to the Strike Corps, and the movement of sub-Corps formations from the East puts a lot of stress on Army Commanders and their immediate Corps Commanders.

The danger of a pre-emptive strike from Pakistan puts entire thought out strategies to risk, and failure of strategies at that level could not mean just court-martials but catastrophic failure of our nations much vaunted prowess and numerical superiority.

Desperate to accumulate brownie points with the masses of our nation, the entire leadership waited like expectant fathers to hear from the Army DGMO and COAS that the deployment is ‘Complete.’ Little knowing, or fully knowing, that reaching this defense condition meant certain manouvres to just ensure that formations would not get caught napping if Pakistan pre-empted us by even a single night in declaring hostilities.

Pakistan, Jan- June 2002

On the other side of the border, two Pakistani Infantry Divisions remained on the Pak Afghan border through out the escalation of the border situation on this side. Such foolishness cannot even be granted to ones own friends, leave alone your enemy. Parts of the Pakistani attack to come from their XI Corps weren’t just there. Presumably the Pakistanis had inside information that India would not attack.

This surety came from the United States, who desperately needed the Pak Border with Afghanistan be sealed till such time that their troops were in control of the ground situation. Given that the Pakistanis had no offensive in place to counter the Indian Strike Corps, meant that Indian Army objectives would be easier to get, making Pakistans posture almost hopelessly defensive. That is a posture they can least afford to have given that the end result could be three nations out of one.

To remind Indians of the Pakistani capability to adapt, the famous ‘Battle of Longewala,’ won as that may have been by the Indians, but a panicked Indian Army Command ordered a halt to the Strike Corps operating North of Longewala, when the result of that Strike Corps success would have been the formation of Sind and Punjab as countries. Pakistani success at Longewala would have had other repercussions, but that’s not what happened.

The only thing that ensured Pakistani safety, in this 2002, was the threat and knowledge of the use of nuclear weapons on advancing Indian troops, Corps HQs, or lastly civilian targets, between 9^th -11^th days of the conflict.

The movement of the Ambala-based II Corps, sparked off a chain reaction from the enemy ground surveillance and intelligence. Within what seems a matter or hours, the Pakistanis got the US on the run. At a local level, presumably, even the Pakistanis knew what the Corps Commander was upto as there was precious little he could do otherwise. However, they roped in the already hyper US into pulling out all stops and moving in the KH12 satellites into the region from their pressing Afghanistan duties, to get intel on the Indian movements.

The Pakistanis called the shots by reminding the US about their requirements on the Pak western front, and the nuclear scenario. The Americans in their true colours called everyone who mattered in the Indian leadership and warned, cajoled, threatened India into backing off.

New Delhi, June 2002

The reaction of the Indian government was almost ridiculous. The leadership acted as if the entire armed forces deployment was a NCC exercise, and denied any intent to open or start hostilities. When shown proof of the movement of the Units in II Corps, the reaction turned allergic to our own troops.

The II Corps Commander was shown the door for his actions, when he really had no alternative to what he was doing. He just protected his formation by moving Units around, not to let the Pakistanis know where his Divisions were going to cross. Given the frontage that the Strike Corps had, it couldn’t be more than a frontage of 40-60 Km and there could have been a devastating block by some quickly responsive Pakistani Brigade across the already heavily defended IB.

A government that is so removed from the repercussions of its actions, that its military was made to back down miserably under political pressure from the United States and its Afghanistan agenda has made the entire Indian Armed Forces look up and take notice. The issue within the Armed Forces was so strong that the COAS had to publicly state that the ‘morale of the Army is my problem.’ Isn’t it sad that the Chief had to make a statement like that to begin with? That too, to answer a question of the morale of an army whose readiness, courage, valour and dedication to duty, till yesterday was beyond question.

The Future

The empty space in the Pakistani Strike formations should have signaled something to the Army, who went blindfolded into thinking that their moment of glory had arrived. Adequate intelligence gathering, or dissemination of the same, was not done in the matter by either the Army’s Intelligence Corps or by the team that briefs the PM. It could be worse, if all this has knowingly transpired, and someone in the leadership stymied the repercussions of the non-movement of two enemy Infantry Divisions and its possible meanings.

A government that so quickly catapulted to the US pressure, in removing its Strike Force Commander, at a time when war was seemingly so evident, makes one wonder, if they ever had it in them to lead our country to war. And if they did, when and how they would turn tail during the conflict, faced with a certain nuclear war scenario.

All this smoke screen put out in the media towards ‘short term hostilities’ involving Special Forces here and there, makes one wonder if the leadership would already have thought of buckling under pressure by day 7/9 of war given that some US intelligence report would have conveniently come through showing the F-16s being readied somewhere in the Chagai Hills.

The intent of this article is to highlight a political leadership that does not know how to use its Armed Forces, as all they would have had to do was move some Brigades around the border to get the world attention, rather than dragging our soldiers from leaves and courses only to leave them spending months with their hearts pumping, only to go home.

Think into the future

A government that has backed down on being shown a few pictures of a movement that was essential to its very survival and success of those Units, cannot lead you to war.

And if your Parliament House was attacked and you don’t do anything, then I am sure that there cannot be a stronger reason to attack.

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